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     1 Introduction
In the last decades, experimental research on private provision of public
goods has been successfully conducted within the well-known Public Goods
Game (PGG) or Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (VCM) setting, where
a low number of subjects are given identical initial endowments and allowed
to either invest (possibly part of) it in a public account or keep it in a pri-
vate account. As Masclet et al. (2003) observe: this game is appealing as
\it starkly isolates the con°ict between self-interest and group interest and
allows a simple measure of the extent of group-interested behavior" (p. 366).
Lab evidence indicates that economic theory overestimates the relevance of
free riding, as subjects cooperate signi¯cantly more than would be predicted
on the basis of the so called `sel¯shness axiom'. However, while within unre-
peated PGG environments, as well as in the ¯rst rounds of repeated PGGs,
average contribution levels are relatively high, iteration of strategic inter-
action for a ¯nite number of rounds leads to the well-known `decay' phe-
nomenon, so that, as the game unfolds, contribution levels gradually decline
and almost full free riding prevails in the last round (Ledyard 1995). By
contrast, the introduction of costly punishment options turns out to make
the di®erence: insofar as subjects are allowed to sanction each other, high
average contribution levels become sustainable and the decay phenomenon
does not occur (see Fehr and GÄ achter 2000; 2002). This result is surprising,
due to the presence of clear ¯nancial incentives to act sel¯shly and, hence,
to abstain from both contributing to the public good and punishing others -
since punishment itself is a (second-order) public good for the group. Exper-
imental research has also shown that the relatively high average contribution
levels observed within repeated PGGs with punishment options are associ-
ated with a signi¯cant degree of behavioral heterogeneity. In particular, some
players turn out to play sel¯shly and ride free on others' generosity, while
others both contribute to the public account and are willing to costly sanc-
tion low contributors - even though this is `irrational' from the viewpoint
of standard economic theory. In other words, two behavioral types seem
to prevail: some individuals act as ¯rst-order and second-order free riders,
as they both abstain from contributing to the public good (¯rst-order free
riding) and from sanctioning others (second-order free riding; for this expres-
sion, see Oliver 1980). On the contrary, other subjects are high contributors
who are also ready to sanction low contributors (see Fehr and GÄ achter 2000;
2002 and Ones and Putterman 2007). The latter players have been termed
1`strong reciprocators' and display so called `altruistic punishment': Fehr and
Fischbacher (2005) maintain that \Theory as well as empirical evidence sug-
gest that the interaction between strongly reciprocal and sel¯sh types is of
¯rst-order importance for many economic questions" (p. 155).
By means of an evolutionary analysis, our paper provides theoretical sup-
port for this coexistence between strongly reciprocal and sel¯sh players within
a PGG environment with punishment opportunities. More speci¯cally, we
show, to our knowledge for the ¯rst time, that within a PGG framework
with four players simultaneously involved (as it is often the case in the lab),
where we suppose that public good provision occurs insofar as at least two
players do contribute, stable coexistence between free riders and strong re-
ciprocators is possible, in line with the experimental papers recalled above.
Well-known 4-player PGG experiments include Fehr and Gaechter (2000;
2002), Fischbacher et al. (2001), Masclet et al. (2003), Kurzban and Houser
(2005) and Ones and Putterman (2007).
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2
contains the structure of the model. Section 3 contains our major results
and Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Let us consider a (very large) community of individuals continuously interact-
ing over time and enjoying the bene¯ts of a given collective good. Randomly
occurring encounters involve four players at a time, with a material PGG
to be played. While in many experimental PGG environments multiple con-
tribution options are available, we introduce a simplifying assumption and
suppose instead that each single player has to make a binary, `all-or-nothing'
choice: he may either contribute to the public good (by giving a certain
amount of money) or free ride. Therefore, material consequences for the
players depend on their choosing between contribute (or `cooperate', C) and
free ride (or `defect', D) only1. Further, we assume that the collective good to
1We claim that this modelling choice allows us to maintain tractability by retaining
the key qualitative features of the experimental setting we refer to. Dreber et al. (2008)
conducted an experiment based on repeated pairwise encounters in which subjects could
choose either between C and D only or among C, D and P (costly punishment). Their
results show that the introduction of punishment options increases the amount of co-
operation over time, in line with public goods experiments where multiple contribution
2be provided is a threshold public good: actual provision occurs only insofar
as a su±ciently large proportion of individuals do contribute to it (Cadsby
and Maynes 1999). In particular, we suppose that if nC is the number of
players cooperating in each matching, nC = 2 is the `critical threshold' of
cooperators needed for the public good to be privately provided2. Hence, the
material consequences of each 4-player interaction (for the row player) are
captured by the following payo® matrix:
DDD DDC DCC CCC
D a a b c
C d e f g
(1)
Table 1 4-player PGG payo® matrix
where:
c > b > a
c > f b > e, a > d
g > f > e > d 3.
Moreover, we suppose that costly punishment options are available, so
that in each matching players can also decide to incur costs in order to punish
choices (rather than binary choices) are available to the players. We view their evidence
as con¯rming that the well-known conclusion that cooperation is sustainable over time
when costly punishment options are available is robust to the speci¯cation of players'
contribution set.
2Like in our model, most threshold PGG experiments assume that players can either
decide not to contribute or to contribute by a given amount.
3By assuming that g > f > e, we are supposing that the threshold public good under
study also possesses the following feature. Once a speci¯c provision-point (the `threshold')
is met (Isaac et al. 1989), the amount of the public good may further increase, provided
that the aggregate level of contributions increases. This is equivalent to assuming that
contributions beyond the threshold levels, far from being wasted, result in further bene¯ts
to the group. In our model, this is captured by the assumption that the individual payo®
from playing C when the other three players also cooperate (that is, g) is greater than the
individual payo® from playing C when only two out of three opponents cooperate (that
is, f), which in turn is greater than the individual payo® from playing C when only one
of the three opponents cooperates (that is, e). For the same reason, we suppose that the
individual payo® from playing D when the other three players cooperate (that is, c) is
greater than the individual payo® from playing D when only two out of three opponents
cooperate (that is, b). The inequalities c > f, b > e and a > d, capture the fact that,
at the individual level, for a given number of cooperators in the group (that is 3, 2 or
1, respectively), choosing to cooperate systematically yields a lower material payo® than
choosing to defect.
3others. However, we also stick to the traditional evolutionary methodology
by assuming that a low number of behavioral types are present in the pop-
ulation and play `hardwired' programmed strategies over their lifetimes4. In
particular, on the basis of the experimental studies recalled above, we decided
to focus on a 2-type population where only Egoists and Strongly Reciprocal
players are initially present. An Egoist or Sel¯sh player (SEL) is de¯ned as
a Homo Oeconomicus who always plays D and systematically abstains from
punishing others. Hence, SELs act as classic free riders (¯rst-order free rid-
ing) and never use the available (costly) punishment opportunities (second-
order free riding). By contrast, a Strong Reciprocator (SR) is willing to both
(conditionally) cooperate and incur costs in order to punish defectors5. As
Fehr and Fischbacher (2005) point out, available empirical evidence shows
that strong reciprocity is thus far the quantitatively most important type of
social preference. Furthermore, experiments suggest that the presence of ex-
plicit, targeted punishment opportunities crucially a®ects the ¯nal aggregate
outcomes (see Fehr and GÄ achter 2000; 2002 and Ones and Putterman 2007).
As Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001) highlight, the answer to the question
concerning how the material payo®s of the individualistic and non-individuali-
stic agents compare in equilibrium at various population compositions cru-
cially depends inter alia on the extent of information agents have on their
opponent's type. In this regard, though it has been argued that players tend
to subconsciously signal their type via facial expressions and other emotional
factors (Frank 1988), economists have been skeptical towards the assumption
that individuals can correctly identify their opponents' `type'. In this light,
we suppose that SRs do not recognize their opponents' type ex ante and that
they bravely play C in each matching6. However, we also assume that, after
cooperating, they can recognize their opponents' type (ex post recognition
assumption) and that if SRs see that their opponent is a SEL, they are will-
ing to incur material costs in order to punish her, by displaying `altruistic
4For an experimental paper based on the PGG with punishment options documenting
the existence of heterogeneous but stable player types in the lab, see Ones and Putterman
(2007).
5Kocher et al. (2008) run PGG experiments on three continents and show that both free
riding and conditional cooperation are ubiquitous, though the distribution of types di®ers
across countries. Fehr and GÄ achter (2002) interestingly ¯nd that a clear relationship exists
between contributing and punishing: in their PGG experiment, 75% of the punishment
acts carried out by the 240 subjects have been executed by above-average contributors.
6This attitude resembles Sugden's (1986) notion of `brave reciprocity'.
4punishment'. In the laboratory, subjects involved in PGG games are usually
informed, round after round, either about their group's average contribution
levels or about their opponents' individual contribution levels. In the light
of this, we claim that strongly reciprocal players use this information as a
signal that allows them to gradually learn the composition of their (usually
small) group and to identify (and punish) free riders. In PGG experiments,
if within a group only two behavioral patterns prevail (that is systematic
defection and systematic cooperation, associated with the decision to punish
defectors), it can be plausibly argued that over time strong reciprocators re-
alize that those who defect, far from making a mistake, are acting as classic
free riders and, therefore, deserve to be sanctioned.
More speci¯cally, we assume that the level of punishment costs critically
depends on the number of SELs and SRs involved in the 4-player matching.
As a consequence, each matching will lead to one of the (material) outcomes
captured by the matrix below:
SEL;SEL;SEL SEL;SEL;SR SEL;SR;SR SR;SR;SR
SEL a a ¡ "
3 b ¡ " c ¡ 3"
SR d ¡ ¸ e ¡ ¸ f ¡ ¸ g
(2)
Table 2 4-player matchings in a SEL-SR population
where ¸ > 0 indicates the cost of punishing and " > 0 indicates the cost,
for a punishee, of being punished by a single punisher. As table 2 shows,
we suppose that while the cost of punishing (¸) is the same regardless of
the number of SELs in the 4-player group, the cost of being punished, for a
single punishee, crucially depends on the number of SRs and SELs who are
present in the group: in particular, it will be "
3 if a SEL is in a group with
only one SR and two other SELs (in this case, the SR is the only punisher
and the cost of being punished gets divided by 3); it will be " if a SEL is in
a group with two SRs and another SEL; ¯nally, it will be 3" if a SEL is in a
group with three SRs. In other words, we suppose that for a single punishee
the cost of being punished depends on both the number of punishers and the
number of punishees.
Expected payo®s can be calculated by using conditional probabilities. By
indicating with x and 1 ¡ x the shares of individuals of the types SEL and
SR, respectively, we have:
5¦SEL(x) = ax




2(1 ¡ x) + (b ¡ ")x(1 ¡ x)
2 + (c ¡ 3")(1 ¡ x)
3
¦SR(x) = (d ¡ ¸)x
3 + (e ¡ ¸)x
2(1 ¡ x) + (f ¡ ¸)x(1 ¡ x)
2 + g(1 ¡ x)
3
where x3 is the probability for a player to be matched with three SELs,
x2(1 ¡ x) is the probability to be matched with two SELs and one SR, and
so on.
We suppose that social evolution is driven by material payo®s only: play-
ers imitate the individuals who achieve the best performances in purely ma-
terial terms. As Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001) observe: \it is possible that
non-individualistic preferences are materially more rewarding than individu-
alistic preferences in certain strategic environments" (p. 233). In particular,
we assume that the time evolution of x is given by the following di®erential
equation:
¢
x = F [¦SEL(x) ¡ ¦SR(x)] (3)
where
¢
x represents the time derivative of x and F is a payo®-positive
function (see Weibull 1995, p. 149) satisfying the condition F T 0 for ¦SEL¡
¦SR T 0 when x 2 (0;1) and the usual boundary conditions: F = 0 if x = 0
and ¦SEL(0) ¡ ¦SR(0) · 0, F = 0 if x = 1 and ¦SEL(1) ¡ ¦SR(1) ¸
07. Under (3), the point x 2 (0;1) is a stationary state of (3) if and
only if ¦SEL(x) = ¦SR(x), while x = 0 and x = 1 are stationary states
if ¦SEL(0) ¡ ¦SR(0) · 0 and ¦SEL(1) ¡ ¦SR(1) ¸ 0 respectively hold; if
such conditions are not satis¯ed, they may or may not be stationary states,
according to the particular speci¯cation of (3)8. However, in any case they
are repulsive.
7In a 2-type population context, the assumptions of payo®-monotonicity and payo®-
positivity give rise to the same dynamics (see Weibull 1995, p. 149).
8For example, under the replicator equation
¢
x = x(1 ¡ x)[¦SEL(x) ¡ ¦SR(x)], x = 0
and x = 1 are always stationary states.
63 Dynamics
The payo® di®erence in (3) can be written as:
¦SEL(x) ¡ ¦SR(x) = ®x
3 + ¯x
2 + °x + ± (4)
where:
® := ¡f + b + ¸ +
7
3
" + e ¡ d + g ¡ c
¯ := ¡2b + 2f ¡ ¸ ¡
22
3
" ¡ e + a ¡ 3g + 3c
° := ¡f + b + ¸ + 8" + 3g ¡ 3c
± := ¡g + c ¡ 3"
Being (4) a polynomial of degree three, at most three interior stationary
states exist. In such states, SEL and SR types coexist. The basic properties
of the dynamics are given in the following proposition9.
Proposition 1 Dynamics (3) are characterized by the following features:
1) At most ¯ve stationary states in the interval [0;1], and at most three
stationary states in (0;1), exist.
2) x = 1 (where all players are SELs) is always a locally attractive sta-
tionary state.
3) x = 0 (where all players are SRs) is a stationary state if " ¸
c¡g
3
(locally attractive if " >
c¡g
3 )10.
4) If x = 0 is locally attractive (repulsive), then an odd (even) number
of interior stationary states generically11 exists. When a unique interior
stationary state exists, then it is repulsive; if two or three interior stationary
states exist, then only one is attractive while the others are repulsive.
Proof. The polynomial (4) has at most three real roots, so at most three
interior stationary states exist; x = 0 and x = 1 may be stationary states
9The conditions over parameter values under which 0, 1, 2 or 3 interior stationary
states exist can be provided to the interested reader upon request. Such conditions are
algebraically complex and cannot be easily interpreted. However, they are useful in order
to think of numerical examples accounting for all the di®erent dynamic regimes that can
be observed (see on this ¯gure 1 below).
10If " <
c¡g
3 , the state x = 0 may or may not be a stationary state, according to the
speci¯cation of equation (3); in such case, however,
¢
x > 0 holds if x is near enough to 0
and consequently the state x = 0 is repulsive.
11That is, we exclude the cases in which the graph of (4) is tangent to the x-axis.
7even if they are not roots of (4). This completes the proof of point 1). To
prove points 2) and 3), notice that ¦SEL(1)¡¦SR(1) > 0 always holds while
¦SEL(0) ¡ ¦SR(0) S 0 holds if " T
c¡g
3 ; as a consequence,
¢
x > 0 always
holds for x near enough to 1 while, for x near enough to 0,
¢
x S 0 if " T
c¡g
3 .
To prove point 4), let us ¯rst consider the case in which x = 0 is locally
attractive; in such case, by the intermediate values theorem, at least one
interior stationary state exists. Since attractive stationary states alternate
with repulsive ones, we have that: a) if a unique interior stationary state
exists, then it is repulsive; b) the possibility that only two interior stationary
states, x1and x2, with x1 < x2, exist is excluded; c) if three interior stationary
states, x1, x2 and x3, with x1 < x2 < x3, exist, then the stationary state
x3 must be repulsive because x = 1 is attractive; consequently, x2 and x1
are attractive and repulsive, respectively. Let us note that the attractivity
of x = 0 is a necessary condition for the existence of three interior stationary
states.
The statement of point 4) concerning the case in which x = 0 is repulsive
can be checked following the same steps.
Let us note that when the population is almost entirely composed of SELs
(that is, x is close to 1), all the components of expected payo®s ¦SEL(x) and
¦SR(x) are negligible except for ax3 and (d¡¸)x3: the stationary state x = 1
is attractive as a > d¡¸ always holds. Analogously, when the population is
almost entirely composed of SRs (that is, x is close to 0), all the components
of expected payo®s are negligible except for (c ¡ 3")(1 ¡ x)3 and g(1 ¡ x)3:
therefore, the state x = 0 is attractive if g > c ¡ 3", that is if " >
c¡g
3 .
Furthermore, it is worth observing that this condition depends on the cost
of being punished ", but not on the cost of punishing ¸.
Figure 1 shows the complete taxonomy of dynamic regimes that can be
observed. The graphs of the payo® di®erence (4) and the trajectories that
the population follows are obtained posing a = 0:3, b = 6, c = 13:5, d = 0:1,
e = 0:4, f = 1, g = 2, ¸ = 0:01. Full (open) dots represent attractive
(repulsive) stationary states. Notice that the payo® di®erence (4) is not
monotonic in x; in particular, it is always increasing near x = 1 while it is
decreasing near the attractive interior stationary state, when existing.
Other things equal, (4) is decreasing due to the increase in the probability
to meet two SELs and one SR, that is the probability that the choices of a
player (a SEL or a SR) are crucial for the provision of the public good to occur
(as it is important to recall that public good provision occurs only within
8groups where at least two SRs are present). In this context, the public good
will be provided only if the fourth player is a SR. The probability is given
by x2(1 ¡ x) and it is increasing in x in the interval (0;2=3), whereas it is
decreasing in x in the interval (2=3;1). Therefore, as x increases, it is possible
that the SR payo® increases compared to the SEL payo®, so that (4) turns
out to be decreasing.
The next proposition shows how the basin of attraction of the stationary
state x = 1 varies in response to variations in the parameters " and ¸.
Proposition 2 Other things being equal, the basin of attraction of the sta-
tionary state x = 1 (where all players are SELs) shrinks if the cost of being
punished " increases or if the cost of punishing ¸ decreases.
Proof. If " increases, then (ceteris paribus) the payo® ¦SEL(x) decreases
(given x), while ¦SR(x) remains constant. Consequently, the subsets of the
interval (0;1) where ¦SEL(x) > ¦SR(x) (i.e. where
¢
x > 0) shrink. The
same e®ect is generated by a decrease in ¸, which determines an increase in
¦SR(x), while ¦SEL(x) remains constant.
Figure 2 shows how the stationary states vary in response to a variation
in the parameter ". The other parameters are the same as in the example
showed in ¯gure 1. Continuous (dotted) lines represent attractive (repulsive)
stationary states. It is worth noting that the basin of attraction of x = 1
has a lower bound given by the highest dotted line. Therefore, it is straight-
forward to notice that this basin of attraction shrinks as " increases. As the
cost of being punished increases, the probability to end up in a all-SEL pop-
ulation, ceteris paribus, decreases. The same occurs as the cost of punishing
decreases. These two variations in the costs of punishment favor punishers
and are detrimental to punishees.
4 Conclusion
Almost two decades ago, in concluding their pioneering theoretical work on
the dynamics of free riding in PGG experiments, Miller and Andreoni (1991)
pointed out: \our understanding of the private provision of public goods may
be improved by more careful research into evolutionary game theory, and by
theory and experiments that examine the motives, decision processes, and
dynamics of public goods games" (p 14). By using the evolutionary method-
ology, we proceeded along these lines and succeeded in `mapping' some robust
9¯ndings emerging from last years' growing experimental research on PGGs.
On the whole, with regard to a SEL-SR population where a 4-player PGG
is continuously played, we found that the equilibrium critically depends on
both information and behavioral assumptions concerning SRs. In particular,
it is the case that, under ex post recognition, coexistence of SELs and SRs
may occur. Our major result is that we are able to evolutionarily account
for experimental evidence by showing that the equilibrium population, far
from being systematically monomorphic, might be a mixture of sel¯sh and
non-sel¯sh types12. To our knowledge, this is the ¯rst work where such mixed
equilibrium emerges within a PGG setting13. Finally, in line with experimen-
tal evidence, we shed light on the crucial role played by both the costs of
sanctioning and the costs of being sanctioned. Sethi and Somanathan (1996)
observe that the use of evolutionary dynamics in their analysis provides us
with a con¯rmation of what can be seen as the centrepiece of economic rea-
soning, that is \the tendency of human behaviour to adjust in response to
persistent di®erential in material incentives" (p. 783). We can also read their
model as providing key insights into the factors which may lead to the break-
down of a norm of cooperation, as the size of the set of stable states (with its
corresponding basin of attraction) critically depends on the parameters of the
model. On a similar vein, the second proposition illustrated in the previous
section shows that, within our evolutionary environment, both egoists' costs
of being punished and strong reciprocators' costs of punish crucially a®ect
the probability that social evolution will lead to an individualistic society
dominated by defection.
12Here we are able to reach this conclusion with reference to a PGG framework where
4-player matchings continuously occur within a 2-type population, whereas Antoci and
Zarri (2008) show that this does not occur with pairwise random matchings (so that the
material PD, rather than the PGG, is played) and several 3-type populations (composed
of Altruists, Egoists and various forms of Strong Reciprocators).
13Under some conditions, Guttman (2000) ¯nds stable coexistence of sel¯sh and unsel¯sh
players by studying a 2-type population made of opportunists and reciprocators. However,
he does not focus on a PGG framework. Moreover, in his model all the players are expected
payo® maximizers and reciprocators are not allowed to explicitly sanction defectors.
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Figure 1: Possible dynamic regimes.











Figure 2: Stationary state con¯gurations, varying the parameter².
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